MOTIVATION: LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
Already by the mid 1990's (1996) , employment decreased between 5.6% (for Romania) and 22.9% (for Hungary), as compared with pre-transition levels. While, on average, the levels of employment have been increasing slightly since then, employment rates remain generally below that of the EU as shown in the table below (Table 1 ) (see Terrell and Boeri 2002, Huber et al. 
2002, Commission of the European Communities 2003).
In particular, Poland has a particularly low employment rate matched by high unemployment. This is important, as the economic growth in the future will no longer result principally from the reallocation of resources, but will have to be more closely associated with technological upgrading, new investment and, last but not least, with an increase in employment. At the same time, structural adjustment is likely to continue with some 'old' sectors (primary sector in particular) shedding jobs, with employment hopefully being created in new sectors. The motivation of this paper is to address the micro foundations of labour demand in Poland. In particular, we wish to investigate if we could learn more about the nature of employment decisions from empirical firm level data. We also wish to check if aggregate movements in employment hide divergent trends, which are only detectable, once appropriate cross sections are applied. We ask if the nature of employment dynamics is different, once we take into account ownership, size and industrial sectors? Also, is it becoming more similar to the standard pattern of non-transition economies, as time goes by?
LITERATURE -SOME REFERENCE POINTS

Wage elasticity of employment and the efficient contract literatures
In a seminal paper, Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) theoretically and empirically examine the impact of internal and alternative wages on employment. Their modelling results in three testable hypotheses. The first suggests that if the alternative wage acts as the sole determinant of employment, this reflects strong efficiency of the employment contract. 1 Secondly, if both the internal and alternative wage determine employment, then we have a situation of weak efficiency in employment determination. Lastly if only the internal wage is instrumental in determining employment then this scenario is one of monopolistic price setting by the union 2 and unilateral employment setting by the employer (i.e. 'right to manage' model). Brown and Ashenfleter's (1986) empirical results rely on US data for the period of 1948-65, and they provide evidence of the weak efficiency of contracts. The significance of the efficient contract solution relates to the fact that it may lead to higher levels of employment than the 'right to manage' model does. However, Oswald (1992) offers a criticism of this model and develops a seniority model of the trade union, which merges the above cases, i.e. the monopoly union framework and the efficient bargain model. Oswald's model predicts that bargaining will occur over wages, and unions do not behave as if there is a trade off between wages and employment because layoffs are typically done not by random draw but rely on first in first out rules. With an efficient outcome the contract will be on the labour demand curve, where the trade union is indifferent to the level of employment. Thus the efficient contract agreement allows the employer to pick exactly the number of employees which would have been chosen, given the wage rate, thus it is empirically similar to the 'right to manage' model. The main conclusion from Oswald (1992) is that 1 Under the efficient bargain model wages and employment are determined along an efficient contract, which is associated with the work of Leontief (1946) . With this model wages will be lower and employment higher than in the monopoly equilibrium.
2 Under this framework a union chooses a wage rate constrained by demand for its member's labour and, as argued by Dunlop (1944) , equilibria lie on the labour demand curve. It has been termed a monopoly union as its introduction into a competitive labour market would lead to a deadweight loss usually associated with monopoly (Currie, 1991, p.46) . 3 For a thorough discussion of the theoretical models, see for instance Layard et al. (1991) .
"efficient" bargaining may produce solutions equivalent to the "right to manage" outcome, as it is likely that unions will focus on wages in bargaining.
Due to space constraints, we do not attempt to offer a comprehensive review of theoretical literature.
However, the two references discussed above are intended to illustrate that alternative frameworks may lead to similar key testable implications. Namely:
significant weight attached to wages in bargaining process by employees may lead to a negative correlation between employment and own wages, with outside options playing no significant role in wage determination.
One additional point about transition is that the relationship may well evolve over time.
Unfortunately, the papers written on employment dynamics in transition are severely constrained by data and cover very short spells of time. One exception is Körösi (2002) This is also confirmed by a closer investigation of empirical results summarised in Tables 2-4 below: elasticity coefficients tend to peak in the early transition period.
4 One way to overcome this problem is to compare studies based on samples from similar population of firms in different periods. Indeed, we wish to proceed this way, focusing on largest Polish companies.
Responsiveness of employment to demand shocks; insiders effects
Arguably, state firms in the late socialist period were controlled by insiders. Moreover, many of the privatisation programmes did not change that situation, at least not immediately. The situation can be either modelled by strong position of employees in bargaining or by employee control. Köllo (1998) offers a good discussion of the insiders' control model in the context of transition economies.
The main result that may be applied to empirical work is that employee controlled firms are characterised by low responsiveness of employment to final product demand shocks. The result has been established by the classical literature on employee control, which originates from Ward 1958 (see also Vanek 1970, Ireland and Law 1982) . As summarised by Laidler and Estrin (1989) for the case of multiple inputs and outputs, the labour managed firm always varies employment "by a smaller amount in response to given price changes than do their capitalist counterparts" (Ibid.., p.307).
Several researchers, including those already discussed, test whether firms with different ownership and legal forms experience different employment patterns in transition countries.
Not surprisingly, for the early transition period (i.e. pre 1991), there is evidence that new private firms have contributed greatly to job growth in Poland (Konings et al.,1996) . That may result both from early stages of their development and from the minor role played by insiders in those firms policies.
On the other hand, Basu et al. (2000) did not find significant differences in employment behaviour for different ownership sectors in early transition period in Poland (i.e. 1990 Poland (i.e. -1991 , but their sample did not include new firms. Similarly, Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) 2) large firms in more advanced transition economies downsized faster than in the laggards, and
3) trade re-orientation did not have a significant impact upon employment growth in Poland.
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Testable hypotheses derived from this section are:
Insider control may lead to low responsiveness of employment to final product demand. We expect insiders' position to be strong in state companies, but also possibly in some types of privatised firms.
De novo ownership is positively associated with employment growth, both due to weaker insiders' effects and lack of residual labour hoarding.
Asymmetry between downward and upward adjustment of employment
One interesting implication from Oswald's (1992) analysis discussed above is that employment may fall in response to a positive demand shock, which is also consistent with the earlier 'labour management' models, refered to in the previous section.
Generally, weak or even negative upward output elasticity of employment is consistent with insiders' effects. For instance, Bosworth et al. (1996) assume an insider dominated model of trade union behaviour and its subsequent impact upon employment. Here the union is only concerned with a subgroup of employees E 0 , which may be smaller than total employment. If all E 0 union members are employed then their indifference curves on the wage -employment surface will be horizontal to the right of the vertical line originating at E 0 (i.e. number of core employees), as the union gains no extra utility from increasing employment beyond this level.
Tangency between the indifference curves and the employer's isoprofit curves yield the insider dominated efficient contract. This reflects a special case where the efficient bargain coincides 5 Papers on other transition countries, which discuss ownership cross section include Konings et al. (2003) on with the labour demand curve, which implies lower levels of employment, than would have resulted from the case where union indifference curves slope downwards strictly monotonically on wage-employment surface.
The underlying theory on asymmetry may be traced back to Lindbeck and Snower (1987) . Yet, in the context of transition economies, asymmetry effect has a specific interpretation. In particular, asymmetry may be interpreted as an indicator of inherited labour hoarding: because of existing labour reserves, employment is inelastic with respect to an increase in sales, but not with respect to a decrease. Estrin and Svenjar (1998) and Kőllő (1998) Nevertheless, it is clear that asymmetry is a different phenomenon during transition. Take for example Haskel et al., (1997) , who study the issue of asymmetry in a non transition economy, the UK. They adopt a novel approach, asking firm managers their response to sustained increase in product demand, possible choices being 1) nothing, 2) adjust price 3) adjust employment, among others 6 . Subsequently, they apply multinomial logit in order to examine the response to demand shocks in 369 UK establishments. Their key result revealed that employment adjustment is more common in times of a positive demand shock, as compared to a negative demand shock, finding evidence of asymmetry, but reversed as compared with transition economies. In particular, establishments where labour plays a more significant role in management (in the form of joint consultative committees 7 ) are less likely to increase employment.
On a more general level, where insiders' effects are absent, we expect to report evidence of symmetry as we anticipate that the previous trend of labour hoarding is now over, and thus firms mist also respond to positive demand shocks, as opposed to just negative ones.
This gives us following testable hypotheses:
A stronger position of insiders in the bargaining process (or in another terminology: in enterprise control) may lead to lower level of employment. Employment response may be low or even negative in response to positive final product demand shocks.
Because low upwards elasticity may be also explained by labour hoarding, it is both /i/ low downwards and /ii/ negative upwards elasticity, which can be considered as an indicator of strong insiders' position.
Investment
The effects discussed concerning investment typically abstract from any parallel adjustment in capital stock. It makes sense therefore to check if results are robust to control for investment when the hypotheses are tested. Rutkowski (2002) documents a positive relationship between employment growth and investment.
The impact of sectors and firm size
Results by Kőrősi (2002) indicate that sectoral effects should not be disregarded, in particular companies operating in the service sector may have a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis their employees. However the empirical problem in the short run is that we observe a number of companies changing their sectoral affiliation from manufacturing to services during transition, as they begin to concentrate on sales. While sectoral affiliation is a binary indicator, the real processes are continuous in character. This 'tertiarisaiton' trend may relate to most post-socialist manufacturing companies, without being yet reflected in sectoral statistics, which by definition contain a measurement error, due to their imprecise character.
Size may also matter. Typically, smaller firms were more likely to be privatised and new Brown and Ashenfelter (1986 ) US, 1948 -1965 1. Both internal and alternative wage determines employment reflecting the weak efficiency in employment contracts. Burgess (1988) U.K, 1964-82 1. Wage elasticity at -0.06 Card (1990 ) Canada, 1966 -1983 1. Real wages negatively effect employment (elasticity: -0.03 to -0.58) 2. Weak relation between employment and industry wage. Haskel et al., (1997) UK, 1990 1. Employment adjustment is more common in response to a positive demand shock, as compared to a negative demand shock. Smolny (2002) Germany, 1980-1992 1. Product innovation is positively associated with employment growth. Checci and Navaretti (2003) Several EU countries 1. Wage elasticies vary from -0.3 for Sweden to -1.06 for Spain.
DATA AND METHOLDOLOGY
Data
Hamermesh (1993) Mickiewicz and Baltowski, 2002) . And last but not least, when compiling data for several years, one has to pay attention to the fact that some sources do not distinguish between individual companies and consolidated balances of capital groups with similar names. This has been checked for relevant companies, as compiling both categories into one time series would create a serious distortion in data.
As the data contain information about both the name of the company and location, we were able to match the data set with corresponding administrative units and subsequently with relevant regional labour market indicators available from the Polish Central Statistical Office. A particular problem we encountered was related to the fact that 82 out of 329 companies included in the sample are registered in Warsaw (25%) and they in fact are split into two sub-categories:
companies operating nation-wide, and those where most of their operations are located in the capital city. Therefore, using information on individual companies, we identified 29 companies, for which most of operations (typically manufacturing production, but also hotels etc) are located in Warsaw. The remaining firms (53, equivalent to 16% of the sample) we label nation-wide.
Those typically include both trade companies, retail networks in particular, but also manufacturing, where the majority of operations is spread across several locations. The chosen method to deal with this data problem was to attribute national averages as relevant labour market indicators in the case of those companies labelled nation-wide.
Below we give a full description of our variables and some descriptive variables in Tables 5 and   6 . 13 We also have data on sales. Sales could be a better measure, i.e. more related to outcome from operations, but the data is less complete for that variable and correlation between sales and revenues is very close anyway. Therefore, we opt for revenues. Estimations based on sales are available on request. 14 Apart from median tests (Table 5) , foreign ownership turned out to be neither significant nor affecting any other results in all subsequent specifications. The results are available on request. In fact, foreign ownership is now predominant amongst largest Polish firms. Even those without foreign ownership links would have strong foreign links in terms of trade partners, industrial networks, etc. Thus, for this group one would not expect formal foreign ownership to be a differentiating factor. 15 Basu et al. (2000) use unemployment as a proxy for outside options. In our estimations it produced similar results as compared with regional wages, i.e. turned out to be consistently insignificant and no other results were affected. Again, details are available from the authors on request. Two issues related to the construction of variables are worthy of further consideration.
First, following most of the papers, we use aggregate price indices to transform nominal series (in our case it is CPI, like Christev and Fitzroy (2002) and Currie (1991) ). Arguably, use of PPI at sectoral level would erase some of the effects we are particularly interested in. While using aggregate price index, we do not eliminate impact of shifts in relative sectoral prices on total revenue and sales. That is important, as we wish the change in revenue to incorporate the impact of sectoral demand for final product.
Second, the construction of the ownership cross-section leaves as with no entirely satisfactory choice. The best situation relates to de_novo category, which is by definition time invariant.
Nevertheless problems arise as soon as we construct ownership indicators for privatised versus state companies. To eliminate potential endogeneity, it could be advisable either to use presample information to partition the data or to make the variables time variant. Yet both solutions have its drawbacks. The main problem results from the fact, that in most cases future information was already available in pre-sample time, so it makes little real difference. Namely, privatisation processes took several years to complete (including so called corporatisation of companies), the information was known to companies well in advance and it is well established that the privatisation processes had an impact on companies already prior of the formal privatisation date. For those reasons, in specifications reported here, we opted for time invariant dummies and split sample , making it consistent with the de_novo group. We also report the estimation, where we split the privatised group between pre-sample time privatisations and privatisations during the sample time. Generally, there are some differences between these two groups, but smaller than those between privatised and other ownership categories.
Econometric techniques
Our chosen estimation technique is the Generalised Method of Moments. In their seminal paper Arellano and Bond (1991) find that GMM is superior to simpler instrumental variable estimators and recommend one step GMM for inference (Ibidem, p.293). More recently, Judson and Owen (1999) support the conclusion that this estimation method is superior as compared with feasible alternatives for panels with a short time dimension. The GMM estimator is robust in that it does not require information of the exact distribution of the disturbances and is instrumental in combating the problems associated with potential endogenity 16 . Similar conclusions can be found in Bond (2002) Following this, we made several informed choices in the specification choice of the model.
Firstly, following recommended methodology, we transformed variables into first differences to alleviate possible problems related to individual fixed effects. Also, we adopted a restrained approach in our choice of ownership categories. Given that the relatively small samples of enterprises are available for transition economies, when too many distinctions are introduced, the corresponding groups become small and one can notice volatility of results between various empirical studies.
Therefore we choose the three ownership categories, described in Table 5 below: state companies, privatised companies and de novo firms. In addition, for some issues we explain two 16 We refer the interested reader to Lee (2002) for more details on the GMM technique.
deeper level cross-sections. Namely, in 'state' category, we distinguish between 100% state treasury ownership and mixed ownership with minority private shares. In addition, following the logic of the preceding discussion, we distinguish between "early" and "late" privatisation (see below).
The list of variables is given in Table 5 and descriptive statistics are in Table 6 .
Having taken the considerations above, we estimate the following equations.
where T it and O i relate to time and ownership dummies correspondingly.
We estimate this for all firms and then separately for different ownership groups (omitting ownership dummies). Also we use this specification, along with a "early privatisation" dummy, yet excluding ownership dummies. Equations are repeated without l_rinvrev to check for misspecification. 
Again equations are also repeated without l_rinvrev.
Testing for asymmetry (Kőllő method):
Here the sample is split for increasing and decreasing sales and specification (1) is used.
Similarly, where we split the sample testing for size and industry effects. Table 6 demonstrates that de novo firms create more employment. Foreign firms do not shed labour, unlike firms without foreign ownership. On the other hand, privatised companies shed more labour than all other. However, we have to check if those result survive controlling for other variables. Thus, we turn now to results based on Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimation.
RESULTS
All are presented in the Appendix.
Partial adjustment
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant (the coefficient is 0.5-0.7) for the estimations which include all firms, it is slightly lower once the real investment/revenue independent variable is included (Table 7, 
Internal and alternative wages: testing the efficiency of employment decisions
Specifications including all firms reveal a negative relationship between own real wages and employment growth. The coefficient on real wages is -0.2 (Table 7 , equations 1 &5), which appears to be entirely in line with that of Basu et al., (1997b) who finds an estimate of -0.3 for their study of Polish firms for early transition period. Also, our results do not differ substantially from those by Christev and Fitzroy (2002) who estimated slightly lower coefficient of -0.02 to -0.08 for own real wages.
However, when the sample is split between state, privatised and de novo firms, a different picture emerges. The link is far stronger and highly significant for the state sector, and two alternative specifications produce similar estimate of own wage elasticity being between -0.32 and -0.39. On the other hand, the coefficient is low and insignificant for the two subgroups of the private sector.
This result can be interpreted as a sign of inefficiency (i.e. "right to manage" pattern) in the state sector determination of employment. It is likely that priority given to wages result in a significant and strong link between wages and employment.
Following the point discussed earlier, we may expect that the parameters of employment function may be blurred in the period immediately following privatisation. In particular, as found by Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) , new owners frequently commit themselves to protect employment for a specific period of time. On the other hand, in other case, one could expect some labour shedding in this early period. This may explain why earlier research was less conclusive on ownership differences in this respect (additionally, exclusion of de novo firms as comparison matters).
To explore this issue further, we split the privatised companies into two groups: those privatised before (and including) 1996 ('early privatisations') and those privatised later ('late privatisations'). Results are presented in Table 8 . When we introduce a shift parameter for early privatisations, it has a small significant positive value, albeit the effect fades away as soon as we control for investment (equations 1 and 2). This indicates, that on balance, firms privatised later shed more labour (i.e. immediately after privatisation). Few additional details emerge, when we estimate all coefficients separately for the two groups, nevertheless the results should be treated with caution as number of observations is rather small.
Real total revenue
Clearly, real total revenue has a significant and strongest positive impact upon employment growth for de novo firms. Secondly the privatised sector, and for state firms the coefficient is much lower and insignificant, depending on exclusion/inclusion of investment (Table 8 ).
Tentatively we may be able to argue that output growth is being translated into employment growth, as opposed to wage growth in both de novo and privatised sector, but not in the state sector. This is consistent with insiders' control in the state sector. Interestingly, the response of employment to revenue is far stronger around the time of privatisation than in companies few years after privatisation ('early privatisations'), as evidenced by Table 8 (equations 3-6). That may suggest a period of intensive adjustment triggered by the privatisation process. It seems that any agreed restrictions on employment included in privatisation contracts do not constrain firms in labour shedding, which seems to be stronger immediately after privatisation (also, as given by the positive sign of the shift coefficients in equations (1) and (2) in Table 8 ).
Investment
As no data on assets is available, we have to scale investment using some other variable, to avoid spurious correlation, where investment would be a proxy capturing potential size effects. One possible choice would be employment, but having employment on the left-hand side would imply another spurious link with denominator of scaled investment. Thus, we opt for a measure, which is investment per revenues, which we first difference. 17 Basic results are presented in Table 7 , equations (5)- (8) and Table 8 , equations (2), (5) and (6). The relationship between investment per revenue and employment growth is positive and significant for all firms apart from the privatised group. For the latter group, we also tested if there is a difference between 'early' and 'late' privatisations, but no significant results were obtained (Table 8 , equations (5) and (6)). Our findings are consistent with those of Rutkowski (2002) who documents a positive relationship between employment growth and investment (his measure being log of the index of fixed capital growth over one year).
17 Hall et al. (1998) examine studies of investment over the last twenty years. They state that the method of normalisation of the investment variable is inconsequential, whether by assets, sales or employment (Ibidem, .
Asymmetry
There is more than one method to address the asymmetry issue. To check for robustness, we decided to replicate both the methodology of Kőllő (1998) , who splits the sample for positive and decreasing output and that of Christev and Fitzroy (2002) , who first include dummy variables for positive and negative growth rate of sales, and next interactive effects with ownership dummies. Our results are shown in Tables 9-10 .
When using the whole sample, in Table 9 , the change in real total revenue is significantly associated with employment dynamics for both positive and negative shocks. Interestingly however, once we control for investment, the coefficient on response of employment to a positive change in output shrinks and becomes similar in magnitude to that on negative change in revenue (Table 9 , models 1-4). It seems that investment plays an important role in generating additional employment, again in line with Rutkowski (2002) . Overall, aggregate results suggest that employment responsiveness is not restricted to a decline in real total revenue in this late transition period, i.e. labour hoarding is now over perhaps. Our results differ from that for the earlier period, i.e. of Christev and Fitzroy (2002) who find a significant asymmetric response only for negative sales growth for 1994 . As our data relates to a later period this finding may not be surprising: as the transition continues, labour hoarding effect may be disappearing amongst Polish firms. Thus when firms experience a positive demand shock they are inclined to adjust their labour force accordingly. Again, while size of the coefficient changes, otherwise the result survives the inclusion of the real investment variable.
Christev and Fitzroy (2002) also interact real sales growth (separated into positive and negative) with their ownership dummies. As they have different ownership groups from ours it is not possible to directly compare our results (see our models 5-8 in Table 9 ). However, in line with aggregate results, they find that these interaction variables are insignificant for all ownership types in response to positive sales growth, and significant in response to negative change in sales, with state firms exhibiting lowest elasticity (Ibidem, p.265). In contrast, our results show significant differences in responses to both positive and negative change in revenues across ownership sectors. In particular, there is a striking difference in responsiveness to negative shocks between the private sector (both privatised and de novo companies) and the state sector (both 'unreformed' state companies and those with minority private stakes). While private firms exhibit strong responsiveness of employment to negative shocks, the effect is non-existent in the state sector: elasticity coefficients are insignificant and mostly close to zero. The fault line is slightly different when we consider responsiveness to positive shocks. Here again, the 'unreformed' state companies behave differently from private companies, however this time companies with mixed ownership are far closer to the private sector. While private firms increase employment in response to positive sales growth, state companies do not. Even more interestingly, once we control for investment, the state sector exhibits negative response in employment to increase in revenue. The coefficient is significant regardless of the estimation method, i.e. while using robust estimation and two stage in addition to standard one stage . Also, the size of the coefficient does not change. The result may be interpreted in two alternative ways. First, it is consistent with insiders (employee)
control models, where firms may reduce employment in response to positive shocks.
Alternatively, assuming that some labour hoarding was still present in state companies, an increase in revenue may help the companies to cover the costs of redundancies.
As an additional check on asymmetry results, Table 10 presents the split for firms with increasing and decreasing growth in real total revenue (in line with Kőllő(1998) , Kőrősi (2002), and Estrin and Svenjar (1998) ). While the number of observation is evenly split between increasing and decreasing firms, estimation for the latter groups suffer from some structural problems, as evidenced by high values of Sargan test statistics (Table 10 , equations (1)- (4)).
Moreover, the situation does not improve once the two step procedure is applied. Thus, while we report specifications for decreasing output, we restrain ourselves from any additional analysis, to err on the cautious side, even if Sargan test is known to be over-restrictive in the presence of heteroscedascity. For the firms with increasing output, two results stand apart. First, we are able to confirm again that investment plays an important role supporting employment creation.
Second, once we control for investment, de novo firms stand apart as a group with the strongest employment creation (Table 10, equation 7) . This is consistent with results in Table 9 .
Additional checks: firm size, sectors
To check if size effects have any significant impact on our results, we used the following procedure. First, we ordered all companies in the sample according to the size of employment at the beginning of the period. Next we identified two cut-off points (at 33 and 66 percentiles), which divide the sample into three groups according to size. For 1996 (first year for employment in our sample), the cut-off values were correspondingly 841 and 1951 employees. Subsequently we eliminated the middle group (i.e. one third of the sample) and focused on the two remaining groups, labelled 'smaller' and 'larger', correspondingly.
Results of estimations for those two sub-samples are presented in Table 11 . We do not confirm significant differences in employment adjustment behaviour across firm size. Clearly small and large firms determine employment in a similar manner: both exhibit path dependencies according to the sign and magnitude of the lagged dependent variable, also employment responds positively to revenue in both cases, and real wage negatively affects employment. A single interesting difference relates to the role of investment, which plays far more important role supporting employment creation in larger companies than in the smaller group. Also, equation
(1) indicates some difference in the group of large companies, which can be attributed to de novo sector, nevertheless it becomes insignificant, as soon as we control for investment. Table 12 depicts employment behaviour for sectoral cross -section. Being constrained by the sample size, we differentiated between industry and services, and additionally tested for manufacturing, as a more homogenous group within industry. While some differences exist, the basic pattern is not very different. In all groups real total revenue has a positive impact upon employment and again we can argue that output is being translated into employment growth, as opposed to wage growth, a trend which we already saw in the basic specification.
Finally, we attempt to control for the monopoly position and include a measure of revenue as a ratio of sectoral output, however this appeared to be an insignificant factor in determining employment 18 .
Also, we did not found evidence that the distinction between firms with foreign and domestic ownership is a significant factor affecting employment dynamics.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
By using data from a panel of large Polish firms we have managed to make some interesting findings concerning firm employment behaviour. Our dataset differs slightly from similar studies such as Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) , Basu et al., (2000) and Christev and Fitzroy (2002) as (1) our data covers a longer and later period, thus we are able to make observations for employment determination further in to the transition process, (2) we identify de novo companies, which by late 1990's were already present amongst the largest firms.
Firstly, we find that employment is affected by internal wages, and not external, reflecting a monopoly price setting union and unilateral employment setting by the employer (Brown and Ashenfelter, 1986) . The link between own wages and employment is far stronger for state firms.
Second, as far as the asymmetry hypothesis is concerned, our results differ form earlier studies such as Kőllő (1998) and Christev and Fitzroy (2002) . We find that firms no longer only respond to a decline in real total revenue, but a positive demand shock too, this suggests that the earlier residual labour hoarding is now over.
Third, it is clear that firm performance (measured as growth in real total revenue 19 ) translates into employment growth, which is apparent in all specifications. However, the effect is small/insignificant for state companies. Moreover, once we check for asymmetry, we discover that SOEs exhibit an interesting anomaly, which is consistent with the insiders' control model. 18 This variable appeared to be significant and positive when testing the asymmetry hypothesis using the Christev Namely, large state firms respond to positive shocks by cutting employment (once we control for investment).
Fourth, when we split the sample on the basis of firm size and sector, larger firms do not appear to be behaving differently from their smaller counterparts, apart from that investment is far more important for employment creation in the largest firms. Generally, we found consistent evidence of a relationship between investment and employment: investment appears to be employment enhancing.
Finally, firms from the service industry are not very different from firms of the industrial sectors.
From this analysis we hope to have given a clearer picture of employment determination in the later transition period. To enhance this analysis further it would be interesting to repeat this analysis with data from "laggard" transition economies, in order to see how firm employment behaviour differs in these countries.
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